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KNOCKOUT: CONCUSSED PLAYERS SENDING THE 
NFL DOWN FOR THE COUNT 
 
David Chaise 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the current concussion litigation surrounding the 
National Football League (NFL) and its retired players. This article will focus on the legal claims 
that the retired players can assert, rather than the moral obligation that the NFL may have failed 
to provide. First, the retired players must establish that a duty existed for the NFL to protect its 
players against long-term health effects from head injuries suffered during NFL games, 
independent of the collective bargaining agreement. Secondly, the retired players wish to prove 
that the NFL concealed facts and scientific data from its players to continue their participation in 
professional football games. Further, the retired players assert that the NFL and its teams 
conspired to reject scientific findings that show long-term effects of concussions. 
 To begin, this paper briefly reviews medical evidence of long-term effects from brain 
injuries. Specifically, this article will chronicle the history and science of chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (CTE). It will then provide a quick overview of the present individual actions. 
 After appreciating the scientific evidence, the article will focus on the litigation and the 
causes of action. In particular, the causes of actions most common among the retired players 
include negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy 
to defraud. Then, the relief sought, which includes medical monitoring, loss of consortium, and 
declaratory relief, will be scrutinized to consider whether such requested relief is appropriate.  
 Following the litigation discussion, the paper will shift to a more legislative discussion. 
Concussions and their long-term effects are not exclusive to football. Other sports leagues face 
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similar issues, and their responses will be presented. In addition, the article will discuss current 
legislation and possible future legislation related to preventing long-term effects from brain 
injuries. 
 This article continues with an analysis of solutions for preventing concussions and other 
sports related brain injuries. Through litigation, legislation, and advocacy, the paper seeks to find 
viable solutions for an expanding problem. However, a solution for past injuries is difficult to 
attain. 
 Lastly, the article explains the effects that would result if the retired players succeed in 
their litigation. This conclusion expresses a pessimistic outcome. Ultimately, it will evaluate the 
economic impact of successful litigation, and conclude that unlike other professional sports 
leagues, the NFL would cease to exist if the retirees win. Through years of denying the long-term 
effects of head injuries, the NFL had pinned itself into a corner of massive potential liability. The 
NFL may be able to implement procedures to protect its present and future players; however, 
similar to the former players, the NFL cannot fix its past. The current litigation will leave the 
NFL with a persistent headache that it may never be able to alleviate completely, and ultimately, 
might knockout the NFL from existence.  
II. SPORTS RELATED BRAIN INJURIES AND THEIR LONG-TERM EFFECTS 
A. Brain Injury Terminology  
A concussion is a closed head injury
1
 induced by traumatic biomechanical forces leading 
to “a complex pathophysiological process affecting the brain.” 2  In addition, a concussion 
“occur[s] when different levels of the brain tissue are compressed together, forced to slide and 
shear across each other, or are torn apart.”3 Further, a concussion shortly impairs neurological 
functions that spontaneously resolve themselves, rather than affecting anatomical structure.
4
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 Although a single concussion does not affect the anatomical brain structure, repetitive 
concussions have more serious effects than merely a short-lived neurological functional 
impairment. First, second-impact syndrome occurs when a person sustains a second concussion 
before the symptoms of his last concussion have ceased.
5
 Almost all persons who experience 
second-impact syndrome become disabled, and the mortality rate is an alarming 50%.
6
 Secondly, 
multiple concussions may cause long-term effects, such as Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy 
(CTE). Common to athletes and others whom have suffered multiple concussions, CTE is a 
progressive degenerative disease of the brain.
7
 Symptoms of CTE include concentration and 
memory problems, which may escalate to various forms of dementia, including Alzheimer’s 
disease and Parkinson’s disease.8 Additionally, mental health issues, such as depression, may 
develop from CTE.
9
  
 B. A History of Brain Injury in Sport  
Beginning in the 1920s, medical experts started to research the effects of brain injuries 
related to sports. In 1928, Dr. Harrison Martland, a pathologist and Essex County, New Jersey 
Chief Medical Examiner, discovered that former boxers exhibited similar symptoms to patients 
with brain damaging illnesses, including epidemic encephalitis, or the inflammation of the 
brain.
10
 Although Martland’s article on the “punch-drunk” boxer could not be substantiated at the 
time, other physicians followed his research. From the 1930s until 1973, medical experts 
proposed that punches caused the brain to bounce inside the skull, destroying tissue and leading 
to irreversible scar tissue.
11
 However, some neurologists disagreed, finding that only 1 out of 
3,800 knocked out boxers who later underwent an electroencephalography (EEG) test 
demonstrated significant brain-wave changes.
12
 These neurologists concluded that a knockout 
punch produced temporary unconsciousness, but no long-term health effects.
13
 However, once 
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technology improved, medical experts understood that an EEG could not test for structural 
changes in the brain.
14
 In the 1980s, X-ray computed tomography (CT scans) and magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) would help support this understanding, and provide better exams for 
brain traumas.
15
 
 Notably, in 1973, British researchers published pathology reports of deceased boxers 
from 1900 to 1940. The posthumous examinations revealed that the boxers suffered severe brain 
injuries. Family members’ descriptions of the boxers’ lives and habits conveyed speech 
difficulties, memory loss, and tremors, which are commonly associated with Parkinsonism.
16
 For 
example, Muhammad Ali’s physician found that his Parkinsonism was due to 22 years of head 
injuries from boxing.
17
 However, the 1973 study noted that preventing brain damage in living 
boxers remained difficult because it could not differentiate whether the damage resulted from an 
accumulation of blows or merely from a single fatal trauma.
18
 After international attention arose 
from deaths in boxing, the American Medical Association called for a ban on boxing because of 
its dangers.
19
 
C. Brain Injury Studies Relating to Football: A Chronology 
 A major factor in the current NFL concussion litigation is when the NFL had the requisite 
knowledge to protect its players from CTE and other long-term effects related to brain trauma 
experienced on the football field. In 1997, the American Academy of Neurology (AAN) issued 
guidelines to prevent structural brain injuries, second impact syndrome, and cumulative brain 
injuries from repeated trauma.
20
 The purpose of the guidelines was to help teams manage 
concussions that occurred during a practice or a game.
21
 According to the AAN’s 
recommendations, only a player who suffered a grade two or grade three concussion should not 
return to the game, and was required to wait at least one week before playing again; however, a 
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player who sustained a grade one concussion could return to the field that same day.
22
 The AAN 
distinguished between a grade one and grade two concussion by specifying signs and symptoms, 
explaining that a player should not return if symptoms lasted more than fifteen minutes and he 
had not lost consciousness.
23
 However, the Prague Concussion Guidelines, first issued in 2004 
and updated in 2005, recommended that any player who sustained a concussion, even grade one, 
should not return to play that same day.
24
  
 Although the AAN and Prague Concussion Guidelines were promulgated based on prior 
medical knowledge in concussion treatment, independent studies specific to football began to 
develop. In 2002, Dr. Bennet Omalu, a forensic neuropathologist, studied the brain of Mike 
Webster, a former Pittsburgh Steeler and Hall of Fame center who died from a myocardial 
infarction.
25
 Webster exhibited depression, diminished cognitive abilities, and signs of dementia 
in life, and a postmortem examination revealed that Webster suffered from CTE.
26
 Additionally, 
in 2004, Dr. Omalu diagnosed Terry Long with CTE after finding “neurofibrillary tangles and 
neutrophil threads in all regions of [his] brain.”27 Long, a former Steelers offensive lineman who 
committed suicide, had exhibited major depression.
28
 Further, Dr. Omalu found neurofibrillary 
tangles and “a brain that resembled an 80-year-old man” in former Pittsburgh Steelers offensive 
lineman Justin Strzelczyk.
29
 The thirty-six year old Strzelczyk was never documented with a 
concussion during his eight-year NFL career, but Dr. Omalu remains confident that Strzelczyk 
suffered repetitive head injuries.
30
 In 2007, Dr. Omalu found “tau-positive neurofibrillary tangles” 
associated with Alzheimer’s and other types of dementia in the brain of Andre Waters. Waters, a 
former Philadelphia Eagles defensive back known for his hard hits, committed suicide at age 
forty-four in 2006.
31
 In 2010, Dr. Omalu and Dr. Julian E. Bailes continued their research at the 
Brain Injury Research Institute, and diagnosed Chris Henry with CTE, who died either from 
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falling or jumping off of a moving truck.
32
 Most alarmingly, Henry was an active player for the 
Cincinnati Bengals at the time of his death in 2009. The wide-receiver was never diagnosed with 
a concussion, and suffered many off-the-field issues.
33
 
  In 2005, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) conducted a survey of 
3,683 retired football players about their overall health.
34
 Over 2,500 players returned the 
questionnaire, for a 70% response rate.
35
 The average retired player was fifty-four years old and 
played professional football for approximately 6.6 years.
36
 More than 1,500 players (60.8% of 
the respondents) reported that they had at least one concussion during their career, and half of 
those lost consciousness from a concussion. Additionally, almost 600 players (24%) suffered 
from at least three concussions.
37
 Further, 266 retired players (17.6%) “perceived the[ir] injury to 
have had a permanent effect on their thinking and memory skills as they have gotten older,” 
showing “a relationship between diagnosed mild cognitive impairment and history of 
concussions.”38 Therefore, the study concluded, “a history of recurrent concussions and probably 
subconcussive contacts to the head may be risk factors for the expression of late-life memory 
impairment, mild cognitive impairment and earlier expression of Alzheimer’s.”39 
 In addition, the UNC study showed that retired NFL players faced a 37% higher risk of 
Alzheimer’s than other males of the same age.40 Of the 758 players who were over fifty years old, 
thirty-three retirees were already diagnosed with Alzheimer’s.41 However, because the study was 
based on self-reported answers, the study could not independently verify the players’ medical 
problems with exact accuracy. Thus, the NFL’s Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
rejected the study as unreliable.
42
  
 However, the NFL acted reluctantly to implement concussion safety measures, declaring 
many studies unreliable. In 2005, the NFL’s Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury stated 
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that it did not believe players who sustained a concussion faced a significant risk of sustaining a 
second injury if they returned to play.
43
 Additionally, in 2007, the Committee rejected guidelines 
from the AAN or the Prague Commission, stating that the recommendations were based on 
opinion, not science.
44
  
 In 1994, the NFL formed the Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) “to 
initiate research and advise the NFL and NFL clubs on best practices for concussion prevention 
and management, as well as for avoidance or protection against other head, neck and spine 
injuries.”45  Its successor is named the NFL Head, Neck and Spine Committee. 46  Dr. Elliot 
Pellman, a rheumatologist and paid physician and trainer for the New York Jets, chaired the 
MTBI Committee from 1994 until 2007.
47
 The other chairmen were Dr. Ira Casson, a neurologist, 
and Dr. David Viano.
48
  
 As of 2007, the MTBI Committee repeatedly denied a link between concussions and long-
term problems, such as dementia or depression through its own studies conducted from 1996 to 
2001.
49
 However, in 2009, the NFL commissioned a study involving 1,063 retired football 
players at the Institute for Social Research of the University Michigan.
50
 The simple question 
asked was whether the player had “ever been diagnosed with dementia, Alzheimer’s disease or 
other memory-related disease.”51 Two-percent (2%) of retired players between thirty and forty-
nine responded positively, which is “19 times the rate for the same age group in the general 
population.” 52  Additionally, six percent (6%) of retired players above fifty responded 
affirmatively, which is five times higher than the general population.
53
 Despite the study’s results, 
the study’s authors found that it did not prove a causal link between playing football and long-
term mental functions because it failed to consider other risk factors, such as genetic 
predisposition.
54
 Additionally, the NFL asserted that the study, which it funded, was unreliable.
55
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Thus, the Committee and the NFL concluded that more research was necessary to determine a 
causal link. 
 Following the release of the NFL sponsored study, in the fall of 2009, the United States 
House Judiciary Committee held a hearing, which included Congressmen, NFL executives, NFL 
players, NFL doctors, and NFL retirees to discuss the alarming discrepancy between the rate of 
former NFL players suffering memory-related disorders and that of the general population. 
Despite outrage from the Judiciary Committee Members, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell 
refused to accept “a direct link between playing football and brain disorders.”56 
 However, after Congress, and thus the public, began to take notice of the concussion issue, 
Commissioner Goodell issued a memorandum to all thirty-two teams that stated a player should 
not return to play if he sustained a concussion and exhibited serious symptoms, “such as the 
inability to remember assignments, and persistent dizziness or headaches.”57 In addition, the 
NFL announced that not only would it “support research by its most vocal critics, but also 
conceded publicly for the first time that concussions can have lasting consequences.”58 Further, 
the NFL MTBI’s co-chairmen, Dr. Ira Casson and Dr. David Viano, resigned.59 They were 
replaced by Dr. H. Hunt Batjer and Dr. Richard G. Ellenbogen, who have both revealed their 
support that repeated head injuries cause long-term effects though with unknown frequency.
60
 
Further, the NFL has given independence to Dr. Batjer, Chairman of the Department of 
Neurology at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, and Dr. Ellenbogen, 
Chairman of the Department of Neurological Surgery at the University of Washington, in 
appointing other members to the Head, Neck and Spine Committee.
61
 Recently, the Committee’s 
independence was displayed with a memorandum reasserting the “Sideline Concussion 
Assessment Protocol,” establishing the “Madden Rule” that warrants a medical escort for any 
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player diagnosed on the sideline with a concussion, and firmly stating “When in Doubt Leave 
Them Out.”62 
III. THE LITIGATION: RETIRED PLAYERS v. NFL 
 As of April 24, 2012, sixty-five separate suits have been filed, with over 1,500 plaintiffs 
involved.
63
 The plaintiffs include retired players, as well as, family members of deceased retired 
players. The complaints filed vary in regards to form: as a class action; a mass tort lawsuit; or as 
individual plaintiffs. For example, in Easterling v. Nat’l Football League, the complaint 
proposes seven distinct classes for players of different eras, where one plaintiff represents each 
class.
64
 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class action permits the representative 
plaintiffs to represent other unnamed plaintiffs.
65
 However, a court must first certify the class 
adhering to certain guidelines.
66
 In contrast, mass tort litigation joins together several plaintiffs’ 
claims into one single action.
67
 Lastly, a few former players filed as single plaintiffs.
68
 However, 
in common with the plaintiffs are the claims, which include negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to defraud. Additionally, the 
plaintiffs request medical monitoring, allege loss of consortium, and seek declaratory relief. As a 
threshold matter, the plaintiffs must first demonstrate that federal law does not preempt their 
state law claims. 
A. Federal Preemption of Labor Agreements: Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA) 
 
 Before analyzing the plaintiffs’ legal claims, it is important to understand Section 301 of 
LMRA. The statute states: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as 
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be 
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 
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parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to 
the citizenship of the parties.
69
  
 
The Supreme Court has reasoned that federal preemption of labor contracts is necessary in order 
to resolve labor-contract disputes, including interpretation of contractual phrases and terms, 
uniformly and predictably.
70
 Additionally, section 301 preemption “is so powerful as to displace 
entirely any state cause of action” for violation of a collective bargaining agreement.71 Further,  
section 301 preempts not only contract claims, but also tort claims relating to a collective 
bargaining agreement.
72
  
 Despite federal preemption of labor contract and tort claims, according to the Sixth 
Circuit, a state-law tort claim may be sufficiently “independent” to survive section 301 
preemption.
73
 First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff’s claim was created by the 
collective bargaining agreement or by state law.
74
 If the collective bargaining agreement created 
the right, then the section 301 preempts the plaintiff’s claim. 75  However, if the collective 
bargaining agreement did not create the right, then the court examines whether proving the state 
law tort claim requires an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
76
 The claim will 
be independent only if the state law claim does not substantially depend on analyzing the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement.
77
 
 In addition, membership in the bargaining unit does not alter the analysis of whether 
section 301 preempts state law claims. Despite retired players’ absence from the bargaining unit, 
the NFLPA and the NFL can choose to negotiate benefits for retirees.
78
 Thus, although the 
NFLPA does not have a continued obligation to bargain on behalf of the retirees, under  section 
301, the retirees can enforce provisions in the CBA that provide them with retirement benefits.
79
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1. Cases Where Preemption Was Found 
The preeminent case for section 301 preemption is United Steel Workers of America, 
AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson.
80
 In Rawson, surviving family members of ninety-one miners who 
died in a fire brought a wrongful death suit for breach of contract, negligent inspection, and fraud 
under Idaho state law.
81
 The Supreme Court of the United States held that the duty to inspect the 
mine arose out of the collective bargaining agreement; therefore, section 301 preempted the 
survivors’ claims.82  
In the instant case, the NFL claims that section 301 completely preempts the plaintiffs’ 
claims.
83
 The NFL relies on Stringer v. Nat’l Football League.84 In Stringer, former Minnesota 
Vikings offensive linemen Corey Stringer died after consecutive days suffering heat stroke 
during summer training camp.
85
 Stringer’s widow filed a negligence claim against the NFL for 
failing to minimize the risk of heat stroke, to establish regulations, and to monitor heat-related 
illness.
86
 The Southern District of Ohio found that although Stringer’s negligence claim did not 
arise directly from the CBA, the claim was preempted because it was substantially dependent 
upon analyzing the CBA’s provisions imposing duties for medical treatment of its players.87 
Despite the NFL’s “Hot Weather Guidelines” contained in the NFL’s 1991 Game Operations 
Manual, which was effective at the time of Stringer’s death, the Stringer court found that the 
CBA did not incorporate the Manual; thus, it excluded an express or implied provision imposing 
a duty on the NFL from protecting players from heat-related illness.
88
 Nevertheless, the widow’s 
claim was “inextricably intertwined and substantially dependent” upon an analysis of CBA 
provisions when read with the Game Manual.
89
 For example, the court found that the CBA’s 
requirement for “full-time head trainers and assistant trainers be certified by the National 
Athletic Trainers Association” may have increased the significance of the NFL’s Hot Weather 
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Guidelines if the trainers’ association had not instructed its members about heat training.90 In 
addition, the CBA required the team physician to warn a player with a physical condition that 
would be “significantly aggravated by continued performance.”91 Because the court found the 
physician’s medical training would comprehend that continued performance would aggravate 
heat-related illness, the CBA’s contractual provision was inextricably intertwined with the 
widow’s wrongful death claim.92 
Additionally, the Northern District of New York held that section 301 preempted former 
Indianapolis Colts tight-end Timothy Sherwin’s claims for breach of contract, negligence, 
medical malpractice, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.
93
 Sherwin alleged that the Colts failed to provide adequate care, and that 
the team intentionally withheld information regarding his neck injury.
94
 Specifically, Sherwin 
continued to practice despite numbness and tingling because the physicians refused to discuss his 
injury with him.
95
 After being traded, Sherwin’s new team discovered he had a herniated disc in 
his spine that required surgery.
96
 The Northern District of New York highlighted two provisions 
of the CBA, which had expired, but the parties continued to abide by its terms.
97
 First, the 
Sherwin court noted that when 
Player is injured in the performance of his services under this contract and 
promptly reports such injury to the Club physician or trainer, then Player 
will receive such medical and hospital care during the term of this contract 
as the Club physician may deem necessary […].98  
 
Secondly, the Northern District of New York found that the CBA contained a clause 
for player injuries: 
If a Club physician advises a coach or other club representative of a 
player’s physical condition which could adversely affect the player’s 
performance or health, the physician will also advise the player […].99  
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Thus, the court concluded that Sherwin’s causes of actions were “substantially dependent” upon 
analyzing the CBA; therefore, the claims were causes of action under section 301 that were 
subject to arbitration.
100
 
 Further, in Givens v. Tennessee Football, Inc., former Titans wide receiver David Givens 
claimed that the team exhibited the state law torts of “outrageous conduct,” negligent infliction 
of emotional or physical injury, and breach of contract because it withheld information regarding 
his knee injury.
101
 Similar to Sherwin discussed above, the Middle District of Tennessee 
concluded that because the CBA’s clause requiring a physician to advise a player of his 
condition when the physician advises the team, his claims were not sufficiently independent from 
the CBA’s terms.102 Thus, the court dismissed Givens’s suit because section 301 preempted his 
claims. 
2. Cases That Were Not Preempted 
Although §301 preempted Stringer’s wrongful death claim against NFL, the District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that a state law claim existed against the NFL, 
Riddell, and NFL Properties, which licensed the Riddell equipment, for defective design.
103
 
Stringer’s widow claimed that the helmet and shoulder pads prevented “evaporation and heat 
dissipation.”104 The Stringer court found that although the CBA created a “Joint Committee on 
Player Safety and Welfare” to discuss aspects of playing equipment, the NFL was not a member 
of the committee and did not need to adopt the committee’s recommendations.105 Thus, because 
the CBA did not impose a duty on either the NFL or NFL Properties to ensure that the equipment 
protected from risk of heat-related illness, the duty must have arose from common law.
106
 
Additionally, when a referee negligently threw a penalty flag, striking and seriously 
injuring Cleveland Brown offensive tackle Orlando Brown’s eye, the Southern District of New 
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York found that a court would not need to interpret any terms of the CBA to adjudicate Brown’s 
negligence claims.
107
 The court reasoned that because the NFL owed a duty to the general public 
to “use due care in throwing small weighted objects,” the negligence could have harmed even an 
innocent bystander, which established a duty independent of the CBA.”108 
Further, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that former San Diego cornerback John 
Hendy’s claims for negligent hiring and negligent and intentional withholding of medical 
information against the team and its physician were not preempted under section 301.
109
 
Although the CBA required each team to hire a board certified orthopedic surgeon, Hendy, who 
was dismissed from the Chargers after reinjuring his knee, did not allege that the team failed to 
hire an orthopedic surgeon.
110
 Rather, the player’s claim was grounded in California’s duty of 
care when hiring, which was independent of any duty in the CBA.
111
 In addition, the CBA 
included provisions that required the physician to inform the player of his medical condition 
when the physician advised the team of the player’s condition, as well as, giving the player the 
right to review his medical records twice per year.
112
 Despite these provisions in the CBA, the 
Ninth Circuit found that intentional and negligent withholding of medical information was not 
preempted because state law imposed an independent duty of informed consent.
113
 Further, 
similar to Brown, which determined that the player’s status was irrelevant to determine the 
referee’s duty, the Hendy court acknowledged that the claim did not depend on Hendy’s status as 
a player under the Players Association, but instead, “[t]he identical claim could be asserted by 
anyone Dr. Losse treated in connection with his employment.”114  
3. The Practical Effect of Preempting State Law Causes of Action Under Section 301 
 
 Practically, preempting state law causes of actions has a profound effect on the 
administration of a legal case. Although LMRA section 301, quoted above, compels sole federal 
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jurisdiction of disputes under a collective bargaining agreement, Congress intended to encourage 
parties to agree to arbitration.
115
 As stated in LMRA section 203(d), “Final adjustment by a 
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of 
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing [CBA].” 116 
Therefore, if a court finds that section 301 preempts a claim, and the parties had agreed to 
include a provision for grievance arbitration, only the agreed upon forum can be used to interpret 
the CBA.
117
  
Here, the CBA at issue contains an arbitration provision that directs  
any dispute…arising after the execution of this Agreement and involving 
the interpretation of, application of, or compliance with, any provision of 
this Agreement, the NFL Player Contract, or any applicable provision of 
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws pertaining to terms and conditions of 
employment of NFL players, will be resolved exclusively in accordance 
with the [arbitration] procedure set forth in this Article except wherever 
another method of dispute resolution is set forth elsewhere in this 
Agreement, and except wherever the Settlement Agreement provides that 
the Special Master, Impartial Arbitrator, the Federal District Court or the 
Accountants shall resolve a dispute.
118
 
 
Thus, if a district court finds section 301 preemption, the claims will be arbitrated rather than 
litigated in court.  
4. Applying LMRA Section 301 Preemption to NFL Concussion Litigation 
The above cases establish an effective framework to apply section 301 to the current NFL 
Concussion Litigation. A District Court would likely find that the retired players’ claims are 
substantially dependent on interpreting the CBA, and thus, section 301 would preempt state law 
causes of action. For the players to avoid section 301 preemption, they must state a claim that 
does not rely upon the CBA or an interpretation of the CBA’s language. Even if the language is 
not expressly stated in the CBA, the CBA will preempt the claim if it is inextricably intertwined. 
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Thus, the players’ and their families’ claims depend on defective equipment, a general duty to 
others, negligent hiring, or intentional withholding of medical information. 
Most importantly, the CBAs have changed over time, but every CBA has addressed 
player health and safety. Addressing medical care, the 1969 NFL bylaws provided an ambulance 
available to both teams,
119
 the bylaws in 1980 stated that the Club’s medical staff determined the 
recovery time for players’ injuries, 120  the 1993 CBA provided that an injured player who 
promptly reported injury would receive medical care as the Club physician deemed necessary,
121
 
and the CBAs provided for certified orthopedic surgeons
122
 and trainers.
123
 Additionally, 
beginning from the 1982 CBA, players had the express right to obtain a second medical opinion 
paid for by the Club.
124
 Further, player safety provisions had been in place since 1970, where the 
CBA established a Joint Committee on Player Safety and Welfare to discuss equipment, surfaces, 
facilities, rules, and player-coach relationships
125
 Additionally, the CBAs empowered the 
Commissioner to refer playing rule changes affecting player safety to the committee.
126
 Under 
the 1982 CBA, the NFLPA could investigate and request an arbitration hearing related to 
adopting playing rule changes that would adversely affect player safety.
127
 In addition, the CBAs 
have provided for various benefits, including injury grievances,
128
 termination pay,
129
 workers’ 
compensation,
130
 severance pay,
131
 supplemental disability benefits,
132
 providing hearings before 
a benefits arbitrator,
133
 injury protection benefits,
134
 and the newly established “88 Plan” that 
provides medical benefits to former players with dementia.
135
  
Here, the retired players allege that the NFL has “consistently adopted and exercised a 
duty to protect the health and safety of its players by implementing rules, policies, and 
regulations,” thus confirming its duty to protect players from risk.136 Thus, while attempting to 
stress that the NFL breached this duty by various failures in protection, the plaintiffs undermine 
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their argument to avoid arbitration. Because the retired players admit that the CBA, bylaws, and 
other rules establish a duty, an interpretation of the CBAs would be necessary. Therefore, section 
301 should preempt claims that involve establishing duty, such as negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation, which will be discussed in section III(B)(1) and (2). Similarly, the fraud and 
fraudulent concealment claims, as analyzed in section III(B)(3) and (4), require a duty for the 
NFL to disclose truthful information. Thus, LMRA section 301 would almost certainly preempt 
these claims, as well, placing them in the sole discretion of an arbitrator as agreed to in the CBA.  
B. State Law Causes of Action 
 Most likely, the section 301 will preempt state law causes of action; thus, the retired 
players would have to settle their claims in arbitration. However, if the court does not find 
preemption, it will have to decide upon the state law causes of action. Although players have 
filed concussion lawsuits in many jurisdictions, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation granted the NFL’s motion to consolidate the cases. 137  Thus, the litigation will 
generally concentrate in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
138
 In the alternative to trial, an 
arbitrator would be required to consider many elements present in the causes of action analyzed 
below.  
1. Negligence 
 To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish:  
(1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of 
this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the 
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) some loss or damage flowing to 
the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result of the alleged duty.139 
 
 Here, the NFL players assert that the NFL had a duty of reasonable care: to protect 
players on the field; to educate players, trainers, physicians, and coaches about CTE and 
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concussion injury; to direct strict “return-to-play” guidelines to prevent CTE; to promote a 
“whistleblower” system where teammates would bring to the attention of the coaching staff of 
another player’s concussion; to design rules to eliminate concussion risk during games and 
practices, to promote research to find a cure for CTE and other long-term concussive effects; and 
to provide guidance to local sports organizations.
140
 Additionally, the retired players claim that 
the NFL breached its duties by failing to perform the following: to institute “acclimation 
requirements or procedures;” to regulate and monitor practices, games, equipment and medical 
care “so as to minimize the long term risks associated with concussive brain injuries suffered by 
the NFL players;” to require composing brain injury histories for each NFL player; to accurately 
diagnose and record concussions in order to adequately and timely treat players; to “establish 
league-wide guidelines, policies, and procedures regarding the identification and treatment of 
concussive brain injury;” to develop medical criteria for players who can return to play; to 
license and approve the best equipment available to reduce concussion risks; and to provide 
complete information to NFL athletic trainers about concussion prevention, symptoms, and 
treatment.
141
 Further, the 1970 and CBA provided that the Commissioner would resolve all 
grievances under the CBA,
142
 and the CBAs from 1982 until 2006 provided for arbitration as the 
forum for resolving disputes under the CBA, the NFL Player Contract, or the NFL Constitution 
and Bylaws.
143
 
 The past collective bargaining agreements contained numerous provisions dealing with 
player health and safety. The NFL’s Memo to Dismiss the Complaint conveys examples from the 
CBAs regarding medical care provisions, player safety provisions, and grievance procedures.
144
 
In addition, although the 1982 CBA expired in 1987, and a new CBA was not reached until 1993, 
players and teams still operated under the 1982 CBA.
145
 As noted in section III(A)(1), the 1982 
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CBA continued to govern disputes between the parties; therefore, the retirees could not avoid 
labor preemption based on an interval between CBAs. Thus, labor law would likely preempt the 
negligence claim.  
 Although many plaintiffs are involved in class action lawsuits against the NFL, a court 
would likely find a class action lawsuit inappropriate because each retired player’s injuries 
originated from different events. In addition, the players suffer from various levels of pain. Thus, 
on the merits, the NFL would assert different defenses for different plaintiffs.  First, the retirees’ 
negligence claim would have to verify that the NFL owed various duties to protect its players. 
This should be an easy element for the plaintiffs to prove because of the natural duties that flow 
from an employer-employee relationship.  
Secondly, the former players and their spouses would have to establish breaches of the 
NFL’s various duties. A court or arbitrator would be required to determine the available 
technology at the time each plaintiff played, as well as, the CBA that controlled each individual’s 
career. For example, medical technology used to diagnose brain trauma includes the CT scanner 
and the MRI, which were both merely in the developmental stages during the mid-1970s and 
were not widely used until the 1980s.
146
 Thus, players who played prior to 1980 would face 
adversity in finding that the NFL breached a duty to them.  
In addition, the retirees would be required to establish that the NFL’s breach of its 
various duties proximately caused their present injuries, including CTE. The NFL would offer a 
strong defense for this issue. Presumably, each player plaintiff has a unique injury history that 
includes not only an individual’s professional career, but also his amateur career in high school, 
middle school, and as far back as elementary school. For example, current Pittsburgh Steelers 
safety Troy Polamalu, who is not party in the NFL Concussion Litigation, sustained two 
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concussions in high school, three in college, and three in the NFL.
147
 Thus, a majority of a 
football player’s concussions may have derived from pre-NFL games. Additionally, concussion 
histories, especially for players who played prior to the concussion awareness era, would likely 
exclude a number of undiagnosed concussions. Ironically, although technology improvements 
and concussion awareness are usually viewed beneficially, the later players’ claims may be 
weakened as a result. Therefore, for earlier players, the NFL could assert that it did not know of 
concussions’ effects, and for later players, the NFL could use societal advancements to deny 
responsibility for players entering the professional ranks with concussions. 
Further, the NFL could argue that it was not its own negligence that proximately caused 
players’ injuries, but rather illegal actions outside the scope of the CBA, which may qualify as 
intentional torts.
148
 Recently, the NFL discovered that at least one team created a “bounty” 
system among its players and coaches to offer bonuses to players that injured specified opposing 
players.
149
 Incentivizing players with extra compensation has precedent. In 1989, the NFL 
inquired into an alleged bounty system involving the Philadelphia Eagles.
150
 Although the NFL 
ultimately concluded that no evidence existed, the prospect of illegal bounty systems could be a 
potential obstacle for recovery. Possibly, however, the bounty programs could enable the retirees 
to raise a state law claim of negligent supervision for the NFL’s failure to monitor its member 
Clubs. 
Lastly, the players will need to show that they have sustained concrete injuries. Assuming 
each plaintiff has symptoms of an injury, such as memory loss or loss of motor functions, this 
element of their negligence claim should be unproblematic. In fact, the players should rely 
heavily on this element. Many of the plaintiffs were once childhood heroes, but are presently 
heartbreaking casualties of a game that they treasured. A jury or an arbitrator will exhibit 
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sympathy for these former perceived courageous warriors. For example, on April 19, 2012, 
former Atlanta Falcons safety Ray Easterling, the initial plaintiff in the NFL Concussion 
Litigation, committed suicide after years of depression, insomnia, and dementia.
151
 In addition, 
the element of a proven injury may be relevant for retirement benefits under the CBA. Mike 
Webster, the Hall of Fame Pittsburgh Steelers center examined posthumously by Dr. Cantu,
152
 
filed for unemployment benefits in 1999 to compensate for brain damage resulting from football 
head injuries.
153
 The Retirement Board granted Webster benefits, but only as a “Football 
Degenerative.” 154  However, the court found that the Retirement Board ignored unanimous 
medical evidence that diagnosed Webster with permanent mental disability occurring before his 
retirement.
155
 Thus, Webster was entitled to the more lucrative benefits under the “Active 
Football” plan, rather than the “Football Degenerative” plan. 156  Because each plaintiff 
experienced different injuries that are presently exhibited by diverse symptoms, a court or 
arbitrator must scrutinize each retired player’s injuries separately. Ultimately, although the 
players might not succeed, they could demonstrate that they were permanently mentally disabled 
at the time of their retirement, thus entitling them to greater retirement benefits. 
 Furthermore, although the retired players may not be able to avoid section 301 
preemption against the NFL, their claims against the equipment makers, most notably Riddell, 
would likely attain judicial review. Similar to Stringer, where the court found that the defective 
equipment claim was not a subject of the CBA, discussed in section III(A)(1), a court may permit 
a trial discussing the equipment. However, it would be difficult for a court on the merits to find 
that the helmets did not adequately protect the players from concussions and their effects. Most 
helmet manufacturers have developed equipment with standard technology, voluntarily 
complying with the National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment 
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(NOCSAE), a nonprofit corporation.
157
 It is currently impossible to guarantee that a helmet could 
prevent every concussion.
158
 However, researchers at Virginia Tech have promulgated helmet 
rankings in its “National Impact Database.”159 Although the NFL does not mandate a particular 
type of helmet, which could either harm or aid the players’ chances of recovery, the most 
commonly worn helmet received a very low concussion prevention rating.
160
 The highest rated 
helmets can lower the risk of a concussion by one-third.
161
 On one hand, the players have access 
to these studies, but continue to choose a poor concussion prevention quality helmet. On the 
other hand, when the litigation is heard on the merits, the arbitrator or court might find that the 
CBA contained enough provisions for the NFL to mandate the safest helmet.  
2. Negligent Misrepresentation 
 Negligent misrepresentation provides another state-law cause of action. A plaintiff may 
establish negligent misrepresentation by showing, (1) the defendant negligently supplied false 
information to foreseeable persons, whether known or unknown; (2) a foreseeable person 
reasonably relied upon that false information; and (3) the person’s reliance proximately resulted 
in economic injury.
162
 Additionally, because an element of negligent misrepresentation entails 
proof that defendant NFL negligently supplied plaintiffs with false information about 
concussions, the cause of action encompasses a claim of negligence. Therefore, negligent 
misrepresentation requires the retired players to first show that the NFL owed them a duty of 
care.
163
 
 Here, the former players and their families allege that the NFL provided the players with 
misleading information regarding the long-term risks associated with returning to the playing 
field. The misleading information was formed through the MTBI Committee, public statements, 
and publications, as well as, criticisms of scientific studies, including its own commissioned 
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study at the University of Michigan.
164
 Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that the NFL 
misrepresented and concealed facts with the intent that the players would rely on it.
165
  
 However, proving reliance will be challenging because of football’s macho-man 
culture.
166
 In 2008, then-Arizona Cardinals wide-receiver Anquan Boldin suffered a Grade III 
concussion after New York Jets safety Eric Smith inflicted a helmet-to-helmet hit, which 
required jaw reconstruction with seven titanium plates and screws.
167
 Boldin only missed two 
games. Two-years later, Mike Tirico, Jon Gruden, a former Super Bowl winning football coach, 
and Ron Jaworski, a former NFL quarterback, announced the New York Jets v. Baltimore 
Ravens “Monday Night Football” game. On air, the commentators had the following exchange: 
Gruden: The last time Boldin played here…He took one of the great hits of 
all time, and here he is. He looks like it never happened. 
 
Jaworski: He took that hit, and he played a couple weeks later. It was one of 
the most incredible recoveries you'll ever want to see. You think of a tough 
guy, that's an NFL tough guy, Anquan Boldin. 
 
Tirico: It was a very scary scene…but [Smith] and Boldin spoke right after 
and Boldin told him, "Keep playing that way. That was a freak accident."
168
 
 
Although this game occurred in 2010, when long-term effects from concussions were widely 
known, the announcers, including a former coach and player, focused on Boldin’s “toughness,” 
Smith’s (illegal) “great hit,” and Boldin’s encouragement to “keep playing that way.” However, 
the announcers neglected to discuss the possibility of long-term neurological damage.
169
 Further, 
present day players, such as Detroit Lions center Dominic Raiola, know that “when you sign up 
for this job, you know what you are getting into.” Raiola added, “I know I’m going to have my 
day when something is going to happen…Memory loss is going to come. I am ready for it. It’s 
worth it; totally worth it. This is the best job in the world and I wouldn’t trade it for anything.”170 
Although other players may not share Raiola’s view,171 it creates some doubt as to whether a 
                                                                                                                                                             Chaise 23 
player’s actual knowledge of the effects would have changed his decision to play in the NFL. 
Thus, the foreseeable plaintiffs, the former NFL players, would have to demonstrate that they 
would have strayed from the tough persona portrayed by other former and current players, 
coaches, and media. Otherwise, it would not be the misrepresentation that proximately resulted 
in their injuries, but rather believed machismo. 
3. Fraud 
 Fraud is a common law claim, specific to each state, but all states require similar 
elements. In Jurevicius v. Cleveland Browns Football Company, the Northern District of Ohio 
stated that a plaintiff must assert: 
(a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a 
fact, 
(b) which is material to the transaction at hand, 
(c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter 
disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that 
knowledge may be inferred, 
(d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it, 
(e) justifiable reliance upon representation or concealment, and  
(f) a resulting injury proximately cause by the reliance172 
 
In Jurevicius, the plaintiff was a Cleveland Browns wide receiver who contracted a 
staphylococcus (“staph”) infection at the Browns’ Training Facility.173 Jurevicius claimed that 
the Browns owned and operated the facility, misrepresented safety precautions to prevent staph 
infection, and the team failed to advise him of the team’s inadequate procedures.174 The court 
found that the NFL’s duty did not arise from or require interpretation of the CBA because the 
failure of duty to warn about risk of infection stemmed from a common law duty imposed by 
“any professional to any person acting in justifiable reliance on that professional.”175 In addition, 
the Northern District of Ohio explained that when a confidential relationship exists, such as one 
between doctor and patient, a constructive fraud claim may arise for “a breach of a legal or 
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equitable duty, which, irrespective of moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent, 
because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure 
public interests.”176 However, because the CBA imposed a duty on the Browns’ physician to 
advise the player if the physician advises the team about the player’s condition, as well as if a 
“condition could be significantly aggravated by continued performance,” but was unclear 
whether it imposed a duty for the physician to warn the player about the training camp’s 
conditions, the court held that section 301 preempted the constructive fraud cause of action since 
a determination of the CBA would be required.
177
 
 In the instant case, an analysis of the CBA would be required to determine whether the 
section 301 would preempt the fraud claim of action. Although fraud requires a duty that would 
likely preempt the claims, the players would likely fail on the merits. The retirees rely upon the 
MBTI’s creation in 1994 and continual rejection of connecting long-term neurological effects 
with multiple concussions until 2010.
178
 They assert that the Committee’s research, published 
papers, public statements, and rejection of outside studies, as discussed in section II(C), 
amounted to not only misrepresentations of concussions’ effect, but also knowingly false 
statements. According to the plaintiffs, the NFL’s goal was to induce players to continue to play 
for the NFL’s profit at the expense of the players’ health. Thus, the retirees seek to establish an 
argument reminiscent of cigarette manufacturers that created Tobacco Industry Research 
Committee, which suppressed and falsified information on the harm and addictiveness of 
cigarettes.
179
  
 However, the players will face the most difficulty in proving reliance. The players may 
have relied upon the NFL’s MBTI Committee, but their total reliance on the NFL’s research 
might not have been reasonable. For example, the players could have relied upon the available 
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studies on boxing, discussed in section II(B), to find that former boxers experienced speech 
difficulties, memory loss, and tremors, as well as, severe neurological damage that was revealed 
during posthumous examinations of boxers, a study conducted as early as 1973. Additionally, 
while the NFL permitted players to return to play after sustaining a concussion, independent 
guidelines advised against the practice beginning in 1997. Further, since 1983, the CBAs have 
provided players with the opportunity to seek a second medical opinion.
180
 In addition, during 
the 2000s, the players had access to the same information than the NFL. A player who continued 
to play after 2002 would struggle to claim fraud because of Dr. Omalu and Dr. Bailes 
postmortem reports of former players, as well as, the 2005 UNC research and the NFL’s 
commissioned study in 2009. These studies indicate a very strong correlation, if not a causation, 
that multiple concussions from football playing lead to long-term neurological effects, such as 
CTE.  
 Lastly, the NFL players’ litigation differs from the Big Tobacco situation. The retirees 
collectively bargained for their rights as employees; however, the cigarette consumers were mere 
purchasers of a purposefully deceptive product. Furthermore, unlike the misled smokers in the 
mid-twentieth century, the players can obtain extraordinary access to scientific information 
through the Internet and other media sources. 
4. Fraudulent Concealment 
 The elements of fraudulent concealment include (1) defendant concealed a material fact; 
(2) the defendant knew the fact would be material to the plaintiffs; (3) the defendant had a duty 
to disclose the material fact; (4) the defendant intended to mislead the plaintiffs; (5) the plaintiffs 
justifiably relied upon the defendant’s provided information; and (6) the plaintiffs were injured 
as a result of the defendant’s concealment.181  
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 Here, the retired players allege that the NFL concealed scientific facts that showed long-
term harm from concussions.
182
 Additionally, the retirees assert that the NFL’s concealment, in 
the form of utilizing the MBTI Committee and advising its member teams on injuries, gave rise 
to a duty that the NFL should be liable for injury.
183
 Further, the plaintiffs claim that the NFL’s 
concealment proximately caused harm to the players and their families.
184
  
 Similar to the analysis for fraud in section III(B)(4), the fraudulent concealment will 
likely result in arbitration. Whereas fraud relies more upon a misrepresentation, fraudulent 
concealment focuses more on the aspect of hiding information. Thus, unless the retired plaintiffs 
could prove that the NFL had performed research, the NFL’s study led to unfavorable results, 
and the NFL concealed the study, a court or arbitrator should find the same holdings for both the 
retired players’ action for fraud and fraudulent concealment. Although the NFL rejected its own 
commissioned University of Michigan study, it did not conceal the results, but merely declared 
that the study was unreliable. 
5. Civil Conspiracy to Defraud 
 To prove conspiracy to defraud, the plaintiffs must show that two or more people agreed 
to perform an unlawful act.
185
 A fact, “such as meetings, conferences, telephone calls or joint 
signatures on relevant forms,” or facts inferring “conspiratorial conduct” must be pled for an 
action based on conspiracy to defraud.
186
 Additionally, some states require malice as an essential 
element of conspiracy, where the purpose of the conspiracy was to injure the plaintiffs.
187
 Further, 
jurisdictions typically preface liability under civil conspiracy to defraud on the performance of 
an underlying intentional tort.
188
 
 Here, the retired players and their spouses allege that the NFL deliberately conspired with 
its teams and independent contractors to reject a causal connection between concussions and 
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long-term mental health symptoms.
189
 The stated goal was to persuade players to return to 
football regardless of trauma that could result.
190
 The retirees stated that the other objectives 
included “prevent[ing] persons bargaining on behalf of players to have sufficient knowledge to 
demand “that policies, procedures, and conditions be included in the [CBAs]”191 and “to deprive 
players of their right to seek damages for concussion-related injuries in court by using the 
[CBAs] as a purported future bar to any civil court action by players.”192 Common among the 
plaintiffs’ claims is that the NFL used the MBTI Committee to cover up and refute other 
scientific data from unbiased sources.
193
  
 If a court prefaces the retirees’ civil conspiracy to defraud claim upon an underlying tort, 
then the claim would most likely be dismissed because of LMRA preemption. Notwithstanding 
this threshold matter, civil conspiracy to defraud will be difficult to support. First, the plaintiffs 
merely allege a conspiracy without offering factual support to show a joint agreement between 
the NFL and its teams, such as meetings, documents, or conferences.
194
 However, team owner 
meetings do exist; thus, it is possible that discovery of meeting minutes could produce a 
concealed conspiracy. Additionally, if a district court requires malice, then retirees will have to 
prove that the purpose of the conspiracy was to injure them. It may be difficult to prove that the 
NFL had a purpose to injure its own players. More likely, assuming that the NFL and its member 
Clubs concealed data showing long-term effects from head injuries, did so in order to profit from 
aggressive plays. The NFL could argue that it would never have the intention to injure players 
because keeping players on the field is more competitive, which yields to greater profits. Thus, 
the NFL and Clubs’ profit-seeking goal remained, and injured players were a byproduct of this 
intention. In spite of this, the retired players would generally have to prove an underlying tort, 
which section 301 would likely preempt. Therefore, a court would not issue a decision based on 
                                                                                                                                                             Chaise 28 
civil conspiracy to defraud until an arbitrator found negligence, negligent misrepresentation, 
fraud, or fraudulent concealment.  
6. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision 
 On April 16, 2012, four former players and their spouses filed another NFL concussion 
lawsuit in a Georgia state court.
195
 For the first time, retired players alleged the action of 
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.
196
 The retirees alleged that the NFL’s hiring, 
retention, and supervision of the MBTI Committee members fell short of its duty of reasonable 
care to hire medically qualified and unbiased physician committee members.
197
 For the former 
players to succeed in their negligent hiring claim, they must prove the elements of a negligence 
action, which includes an existence of duty, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately 
caused by the breach.
198
 However, the plaintiffs would once again face the issue of section 301 
preemption because negligent hiring is a state law claim.
199
 In Hendy, discussed previously in 
section III(A)(2), the Ninth Circuit found that the CBA had no impact on the negligent hiring 
claim. Hendy did not assert that the team failed to hire a board-certified physician, which was a 
duty contained in the CBA; rather, Hendy alleged that the team failed to use due care when it 
hired and retained the physician, claiming the doctor did not have the requisite knowledge and 
skill to treat the plaintiff’s condition.200 
 Here, the retired players will likely overcome the LMRA barrier on their negligent hiring 
state law claim because of the claim’s similarity to Hendy. However, the current litigation 
presents an even better situation to overcome preemption. The retirees do not allege that the 
teams failed to hire board-certified physicians; rather, they assert the league itself did not find 
appropriate members for its MBTI Committee. In fact, the CBAs do not expressly cover the 
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MBTI Committee. Thus, the negligent hiring claim will possibly defeat preemption if the MBTI 
Committee is not inextricably intertwined with the CBAs. 
 On the merits, the retired players have a chance to succeed on this claim. First, the 
plaintiffs will attempt to question the credentials of the former MBTI chairmen. Dr. Casson, 
practices neurology, and was named a U.S. News Top Doctor.
201
 However, Dr. Pellman practices 
and teaches rheumatology and orthopedics, which are fields that normally analyze joints and 
bone structure.
202
 In addition, Dr. Viano researches biomechanics and impact injuries.
203
 A court 
could possibly find that the NFL, an organization with abundance in wealth, influence, and 
prestige, failed to hire the most qualified experts to issue reports about the destruction of brain 
tissue. For comparison, the current chairmen of the NFL Head, Neck and Spine Committee are 
both heads of medical school neurology departments.
204
 
 Additionally, a court could find that Dr. Pellman’s role as both the MBTI Committee co-
chairman and the New York Jets physician, discussed in section II(C), presented a conflict of 
interest detrimental to the NFL’s players. For example, on November 2, 2003, the Jets played the 
New York Giants. After Jets’ wide-receiver Wayne Chrebet fell unconscious in the third-quarter, 
Dr. Pellman had the following exchange with Chrebet in the fourth quarter: 
Pellman: There’s going to be some controversy about you going back to 
play…This is very important for you, this is very important for your 
career…Are you Okay? 
 
Chrebet: I’m fine.205 
 
Ten days after the game, the Jets and Pellman placed Chrebet on injured reserve, diagnosing him 
with postconcussion syndrome.
206
 Chrebet said, “It was stupid, trying to get back out there. 
That’s just me trying to convince them and myself that everything is all right.”207 However, 
Pellman maintained that permitting Chrebet to return was based on his scientific evaluation, and 
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his prognosis would not have been different retrospectively.
208
 After sustaining another 
concussion in 2005, the sixth concussion in his NFL career, the Jets placed Chrebet on injured 
reserve, and Chrebet retired after the season.
209
 Currently, the former wide-receiver still 
experiences headaches, other concussive effects, and concern for his long-term health.
210
 
Therefore, a court could find that Pellman, when evaluating players during games and analyzing 
concussions’ long-term effects, was presented with a conflict of interest. He might have 
overlooked his duty of loyalty to the player in order to prove his findings correct. Alternatively, 
Pellman’s decisions on the field, and personal connections to NFL players, might have 
influenced his research. 
7. Medical Monitoring 
 Although medical monitoring is a damages claim, it is also a form of relief. The 
jurisdictions that recognize the claim of medical monitoring require a plaintiff to show that he 
was  
(1) exposed at greater than background levels; (2) to a proven hazardous 
substance; (3) caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct; (4) the plaintiff 
faces an elevated risk of contracting a serious latent disease as a proximate 
result of the exposure; (5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes early 
detection possible; (6) the monitoring program is different than the 
program normally prescribed in the absence of exposure; and (7) the 
monitoring program is reasonably necessary according to contemporary 
scientific principles.
211
  
 
Additionally, only thirteen states, as well as the District of Columbia and Guam, permit a 
medical monitoring claim in the absence of a present physical injury.
212
 
 Here, the retired players allege that “[a]s a result of the NFL’s misconduct” they have 
been “exposed to a greater than normal risk of brain injury following a return to contact play too 
soon after suffering an initial concussion, thereby subjecting them to a proven increased risk of 
developing the adverse symptoms and conditions [of further adverse neurological 
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symptoms].”213 The plaintiffs request “baseline exams and diagnostic exams which will assist in 
diagnosing the adverse health effects associated with concussions.”214 However, as the NFL 
notes, the medical monitoring claim will likely fail because a concussion is not a “proven 
hazardous substance.”215 Courts have reserved medical monitoring claims to persons exposed to 
toxic and industrial chemicals that invaded their bodies.
216
  
7. Loss of Consortium 
 Loss of consortium compensates an uninjured spouse for the loss of “love, 
companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace,” and support or services.217 However, 
an uninjured spouse’s loss of consortium claim derives from the injured spouse’s underlying tort 
claims.
218
 When an injured party cannot recover damages because claims arose under section 301 
of LMRA, the spouse may not recover.
219
 Therefore, in Sherwin, discussed in section III(A)(1), 
the court stayed the loss of consortium claim pending the result of arbitration. 
 In the present NFL Concussion Litigation, many spouses have claimed loss of consortium, 
or deprivation of services, resulting from the NFL’s negligence.220 Additionally, the spouses 
state that they will be required to pay for medical and household care for the treatment of their 
husbands.
221
 However, these claims are derivative of the underlying negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, and fraudulent concealment claims. Therefore, similar to Sherwin, the 
spouses will not be able to recover in court, but rather must await the results of arbitration 
proceedings. 
8. Declaratory Relief 
 The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act permits, but does not require,
222
 a court to 
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”223 Additionally, once the court grants the 
                                                                                                                                                             Chaise 32 
rights of the interested party, the declaration takes the effect of a final judgment.
224
 However, 
declaratory judgment should be avoided when public issues are presented without critical 
scrutiny of facts,
225
 including using caution where the ruling sought would reach far beyond the 
particular case.
226
 Further, where a state’s public policy favored arbitration, the court stayed 
declaratory judgment until the arbitration proceeding, as required by the contract between the 
two parties, was conducted.
227
 
 Here, the retired players ask the court to declare that the NFL knew or reasonably should 
have known about the effects of repeated traumatic brain injuries, including CTE, Alzheimer’s, 
and Parkinson’s disease.228 Additionally, the plaintiffs seek declaratory judgments that the NFL 
had a duty to advise the retirees about the medical risks, the NFL willfully and intentionally 
concealed medical risks, and the NFL recklessly endangered the plaintiffs by misleading them 
about the risks.
229
 However, a court will decide cautiously whether to grant declaratory relief 
because the relief sought centers on issues that are material facts to the present litigation. 
Additionally, declaratory relief would affect not only the NFL Concussion Litigation, but also 
any litigation in which the employees are subject to injuries where only some evidence existed at 
the time of their employment. Finally, the CBA favors arbitration. Thus, a court would likely 
refuse to grant the requested declaratory relief, finding the issues more appropriate for arbitration, 
or to be decided by a jury if LMRA section 301 does not preempt the claims. 
IV.  COMPARING THE NFL TO OTHER SPORTS 
 Concussion risks are not unique to the NFL. Injury and risk are inherit in contact sports. 
Thus, many sports leagues have developed concussion prevention and awareness policies. 
Boxing, college, sports, hockey, and rugby provide several examples of regulations.  
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 The World Boxing Council’s Rules and Regulations bars boxers from participating in 
sparring sessions for 45 days and no less than 30 days after concussive trauma. Additionally, 
concussed boxers are prohibited from competing in a boxing match until 75 days have passed 
from a concussion. Furthermore, the WBC expands concussive trauma from any act, whether the 
concussion occurred by knockout (KO) or another event.
230
 
 In addition, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has created various 
measures to aid its member colleges in concussion awareness, prevention, and management. First, 
the NCAA, in a partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supplies each 
member college with posters and fact sheets about concussions. Secondly, the “NCAA Sports 
Medicine Handbook – Guideline on Concussions in Athlete” provides recommendations to 
colleges about forming practices to prevent and handle head injuries. Further, the NCAA 
requires each member college to issue a “Concussion Management Plan.”231 
 Although the National Hockey League (NHL) is often criticized for violence, since 1997, 
the NHL has mandated baseline neuropsychological testing.
232
 In addition to further tests for 
players suspected of sustaining a concussion, the teams must notify the league of all concussions 
and an informal “seven-day rule” exists, where players with serious concussions must sit out at 
least one week.
233
* However, NHL teams have begun to understand the importance of sitting out 
concussed players, and have adopted informal team policies. For example, the Pittsburgh 
Penguins’ star Sidney Crosby sustained a concussion on January 5, 2011, but did not return to 
play until the following season on November 21, 2011.
234
   
 Finally, the International Rugby Board issues strict concussion policies. Rugby players 
must sit out three weeks after sustaining a concussion. However, they may receive medical 
approval for an earlier return.
235
 
                                                                                                                                                             Chaise 34 
V. SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 As discussed above, the NFL has begun to acknowledge the long-term effects of multiple 
concussions. More importantly, however, the NFL has implemented policies to treat concussions 
and dangerous plays more seriously. Beginning in 2010, the NFL assessed fines for helmet-to-
helmet collisions,
236
 and currently suspends players for these vicious hits.
237
 Additionally, the 
NFL has taken steps to remove helmet-to-helmet hits from its website and other media.
238
 
Further, as of 2012, the NFL places kickoffs at the opposing 35 yard-line instead of the 30 yard-
line, yielding more touchbacks and less kick returns. As a result, the new rule reduced 
concussions during kickoffs by forty percent (40%) from the year before.
239
 However, the 
“National Impact Database” for helmet ratings has been available since May 2011, discussed in 
section III(B)(1). Because of this independent study, until the NFL mandates the use of the most 
effective helmets for concussion prevention, the NFL fails to properly protect its current players. 
This may lead to a prospective wave of future litigation. 
 Additionally, a fact often overlooked is that football injuries affect considerably more 
non-professional players, such as high-school athletes, than NFL players. State legislatures have 
enacted in thirty-five states, and pending in thirteen states, legislation that would help prevent 
concussions in youth athletes.
240
 Thus, in all but two states, concussion awareness is recognized 
as fundamentally important.
241
 For example, New Jersey requires the department of education to 
implement athletic head injury safety training to school coaches and trainers, provide educational 
fact sheets, and form written school district policies.
242
 In addition, players suspected of head 
injuries are not permitted to return to play until an independent physician diagnoses and clears 
the athlete to return to the field.
243
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 As forty-eight states have shown, legislation could assist in concussion prevention and 
treatment. Although Congress is reluctant to involve itself in professional sports, it has 
interjected its authority when an extensive public policy issue arises, such as enacting the 
Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004.
244
 Thus, in addition to the 2009 Congressional hearing on 
concussions, congressional members have proposed the Concussion Treatment and Care Tools 
Act of 2010
245
 and the Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2011.
246
 Neither of 
these bills succeeded nor explicitly referred to the NFL. However, pursuant to Congress’ 
interstate commerce power, a federal law providing concussion prevention procedures for 
professional football should be successfully upheld if enacted. 
 Ultimately, athletes’, fans’, and the media’s perception of the gravity involved in 
concussions’ effects limits any policy proposed by the NFL, youth football leagues, state 
legislatures, or congressional policies. Recently, the NFL encountered a “bounty” program, 
possibly the greatest sports scandal since baseball’s steroid era.247 After an investigation, the 
NFL revealed that the New Orleans Saints’ players and coaching staff organized a “bounty” 
program initiated in 2009, which allegedly distributed up to $50,000 for hits that would knockout 
certain opposing players from games.
248
 The NFL upheld its punishments, including an indefinite 
ban against the former defensive coordinator, a one-season suspension against the current Saints’ 
head coach, an eight-game ban against the Saints’ general manager, and a six-game ban against 
another assistant coach, as well as, a $500,000 fine and revocation of second-round draft picks 
against the team.
249
 The NFL is still investigating the 22 to 27 players involved, who not only 
complied, but also “embraced” the bounty system.250 However, the most disturbing aspect of the 
scandal may be that as over one thousand former players seek compensation for their long-term 
suffering, modern day players seem to ignore their predecessors’ plight.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 As the long-term effects of playing football continue to confront the American public’s 
attention, and litigation swells in the District Courts, the players’ hopes for compensation remain 
uncertain. The retirees’ claims must not only trump federal labor law, but also must prove that a 
tangible causation existed between the NFL’s breach of duty and their long-term injuries. Both 
“Bountygate” and quotes from former and current players portray that the players’ attitudes 
toward long-term injury remain unaffected. Notwithstanding the available information on 
concussions, players seem to understand and accept the risks involved in playing football. Thus, 
reliance upon the MBTI Committee will be difficult to prove. 
 However, if the retired players manage to win at trial, or at least overcome section 301, 
the NFL might cease to exist. The NFL realizes revenue of approximately $10 billion per year.
251
 
However, no entity is too big to fail. Although there are currently over 1,500 retiree-plaintiffs, 
ten-thousand former NFL players exist.
252
 If every former player, including those not involved in 
the current litigation, receives $1 million, then that would total the NFL’s one-year revenue. 
However, if a jury were to return a judgment for the retirees, it would presumably be much 
greater than merely $1 million per plaintiff. Additionally, if concussion prevalence does not 
subside, insurance carriers may begin to charge monstrous premiums, or refuse to carry NFL 
Clubs completely. For example, ten-percent of NHL players experience concussions, prompting 
insurance carriers to closely monitor the industry.
253
  
 In addition to the NFL experiencing economic loss, football may also find itself as a 
public villain. As former ravaged players file tort claims, their young fans may share their 
horrific fate. Ninety-thousand (90,000) concussions occur in precollegiate football players per 
year.
254
 In 2009, Boston University’s Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy 
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discovered CTE in an 18-year-old high school football player who suffered multiple 
concussions.
255
 The post-mortem examination of the 18 year-old’s brain revealed the earliest 
evidence of CTE ever recorded.
256
 Thus, liability suits could arise against high schools and 
colleges, as well. As a result, high schools and colleges may abolish their football programs to 
avoid liability. This could lead to fewer premier athletes entering the NFL, as well as, a gradual 
decline in league talent.  
 Finally, as studies continue to link CTE to head injuries suffered from football, the public 
may lobby for football’s abolition. Similar to boxing, the American Medical Association may 
momentarily demand for a ban on football. Further, it may only be a matter of time before 
legislatures change their tone from preventing concussions to eliminating football entirely. Thus, 
although the retired players may not succeed in their causes of action, they have brought the 
dangers of football into the public’s attention. Therefore, either through litigation or legislation, 
the NFL should strap on its helmet because it may shortly be knocked-out. 
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